Trump done sold us out (big surprise there).

[WARFAB]

Ding! Ding! Ding! We have a winner!

From both a practical (Molon Labe) and legal (Heller) standpoint, saying every AR lower is now a machinegun isn't going to fly. The courts will either force the ATF/DOJ to clarify things somehow, or this reclassification will become a crack in the NFA.

The law of unintended consequences says if there is no longer a legal difference between a 2 hole and 3 hole receiver, might as well just drill the third hole. People are already refusing to turn in bump stocks. It is possible for the ATF to bite off more than it can chew.

[Norm DeGuerre]

New Year's eve reading:

By NFA and GCA definition (26 U.S.C. 584(b)), "The term "machinegun" also includes "the frame or receiver of any such weapon" or any part, or combination of parts, designed and intended "for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun," and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. "

This is an angle I hadn't considered before, and I'm not sure if it will work for or against gun owners in legal challenges. Previously, three hole lower receivers were illegal because they fell under the above definition of a "macinegun". If bump stocks turn an AR15 into a "machinegun", then that means technically any ordinary 2 hole receiver is now just as illegal as a 3 hole receiver.

Great conceptual thinking .☺️

[WARFAB]

In other news, all this time I've always thought that a bump stock has a spring in it that pushes the rifle back forward after recoil. Akins v. United States already declared such devices that include a spring to be illegal. This recent DOJ RIN 1140-AA52 description of the rule change repeatedly describes a bump stock as a device that "....harness(es) the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter."

A: The trigger is being manipulated repeatedly by the shooter.

B: I know legal language is not necessarily scientific language, but under what definition of the words involved does a device that lacks a spring "harness" energy in any way? Unless I am completely misunderstanding how a bump stock works, it is the shooter's support arm pushing forward that counters the recoil force. The bump stock itself has no way to "harness energy" without a spring of some sort.

Side note: Now I want to go back and look at the crime scene photos from the hotel in Vegas. I thought I recall at least a few if the rifles having bipod.

Edit: This objection/concern was brought up in about 17,000 comments during the NPRM period. The ATFs dismissal of these comments is an illogical word salad circle that seems to ignore the definitions of common words or possibly redefine them. They say one thing, then literally three paragraphs later they contradict themselves.

[WARFAB]

Skimming through the ATF responses to the comments and concerns submitted to the original NPRM are somewhat irritating. A lot of the responses are basically "yeah, your concern is valid, but we're the government and we can do this".

Never mind the fact that not so long ago the ATF specifically said that they can't do this.

And oh yeah, some of the concerns submitted were that doing an about-face on bump stocks would hurt the ATF's credibility. 'Doh!

[WARFAB]

[WARFAB]

Things are happening as the deadline approaches. For all the latest up to date information on the bump stock legal saga, check out this site:

https://www.firearmspolicy.org/guedes-v-batfe

[thughes]

Norm DeGuerre

The GOA brief: https://gunowners.org/wp-content/upl...t__6-24-19.pdf

[WARFAB]

CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.
This Court Should Not Apply Chevron Deference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 B.
The Government’s Unqualified Waiver of Reliance on Chevron Is Controlling Here . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 C.
The Supreme Court Has Ruled That an Agency Interpretation of a Criminal Statute Is Not Entitled to “Any Deference” Whatsoever

I'm still not up to speed on the recent SCOTUS ruling regarding Auer Deference in Kisor v. Wilkie. I'm assuming Chevron Deference is similar and the Kisor ruling more or less upheld the practice.....?

If the Definition of a Machinegun Is Suddenly Now Ambiguous, It Must Be Declared Void for Vagueness

Well this is intriguing. It probably won't result in what I hope for though.

[Norm DeGuerre]

the Courts never address "void for vageness"
but...
let GOA have at them
the only gun "rights" organization worth a crap

[WARFAB]

The first arrest for an illegal bump stock.

https://nypost.com/2019/09/06/texas-man-becomes-first-person-ever-charged-under-federal-bump-stock-ban/

The rifle-toting Texan came to the attention of US Secret Service agents last month after he fired off an email towards the George W. Bush Foundation — telling the former president to “send one of your boys to come and murder me,” according to federal prosecutors.

Dhingra had been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility in the past and was barred from owning firearms prosecutors said.

I was a bit surprised to read that this arrest occurred in Texas, because I questioned how hard Texas LEOs would be pushing enforcement of this law. But when you're a loon who is supposed to be barred from owning guns and you send emails to a former president.......

[Norm DeGuerre]

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1
Statement of GORSUCH, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAMIEN GUEDES, ET AL.

v.

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, ET AL.

on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 19–296. Decided March 2, 2020

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Statement of JUSTICE GORSUCH.======================================

Does owning a bump stock expose a citizen to a decade in federal prison? For years, the government didn’t think so. But recently the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives changed its mind. Now, according to a new interpretive rule from the agency, owning a bump stock is forbidden by a longstanding federal statute that outlaws the “possession [of] a machinegun.” 26 U. S. C. §5685(b), 18 U. S. C. §924(a)(2). Whether bump stocks can be fairly reclassified and effectively outlawed as machineguns under existing statutory definitions, I do not know and could not say without briefing and argument. Nor do I question that Congress might seek to enact new legislation directly regulating the use and possession of bump stocks. But at least one thing should be clear: Contrary to the court of appeals’s decision in this case, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re
sources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U. S. 837 (1984), has nothing to say about the proper interpretation of the law before us

In the first place, the government expressly waived reliance on Chevron. The government told the court of appeals that, if the validity of its rule (re)interpreting the machinegun statute “turns on the applicability of Chevron, it would prefer that the [r]ule be set aside rather than up held.” 920 F. 3d 1, 21 (CADC 2019) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting concession). Yet, despite this concession, the court proceeded to uphold the agency’s new rule only on the strength of Chevron deference. Think about it this way. The executive branch and affected citizens asked the court to do what courts usually do in statutory interpretation disputes: supply its best independent judgment about what the law means. But, instead of deciding the case the old-fashioned way, the court placed an uninvited thumb on the scale in favor of the government.

That was mistaken. This Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it. See Eskridge & Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1121–1124 (2008) (collecting cases); Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 982–984 (1992) (same); see BNSF R. Co. v. Loos, 586 U. S. ___ (2019). Even when Chevron deference is sought, this Court has found it inappropriate where “the Executive seems of two minds” about the result it prefers. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 20). Nor is it a surprise that the government can lose the benefit of Chevron in situations like these and ours. If the justification for Chevron is that “‘policy choices’ should be left to executive branch officials ‘directly accountable to the people,’” Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865), then courts must equally respect the Executive’s decision not to make policy choices in the interpretation of Congress’s handiwork.

To make matters worse, the law before us carries the possibility of criminal sanctions. And, as the government itself may have recognized in offering its disclaimer, whatever else one thinks about Chevron, it has no role to play when held.” 920 F. 3d 1, 21 (CADC 2019) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting concession). Yet, despite this concession, the court proceeded to uphold the agency’s new rule only on the strength of Chevron deference. Think about it this way. The executive branch and affected citizens asked the court to do what courts usually do in statutory interpretation disputes: supply its best independent judgment about what the law means. But, instead of deciding the case the old-fashioned way, the court placed an uninvited thumb on the scale in favor of the government.

That was mistaken. This Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it. See Eskridge & Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1121–1124 (2008) (collecting cases); Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 982–984 (1992) (same); see BNSF R. Co. v. Loos, 586 U. S. ___ (2019). Even when Chevron deference is sought, this Court has found it inappropriate where “the Executive seems of two minds” about the result it prefers. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 20). Nor is it a surprise that the government can lose the benefit of Chevron in situations like these and ours. If the justification for Chevron is that “‘policy choices’ should be left to executive branch officials ‘directly accountable to the people,’” Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865), then courts must equally respect the Executive’s decision not to make policy choices in the interpretation of Congress’s handiwork.

To make matters worse, the law before us carries the possibility of criminal sanctions. And, as the government itself may have recognized in offering its disclaimer, whatever else one thinks about Chevron, it has no role to play when the interlocutory petition before us does not merit review. The errors apparent in this preliminary ruling might yet be corrected before final judgment. Further, other courts of appeals are actively considering challenges to the same regulation. Before deciding whether to weigh in, we would benefit from hearing their considered judgments—provided, of course, that they are not afflicted with the same problems. But waiting should not be mistaken for lack of concern.

[WARFAB]

Prosecutor's drop bump stock charges before trial.

https://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/fi...ion-withdrawn/

Senior U.S. District Judge Gray H. Miller convicted Ajay Dhingra, 44, on three remaining counts that he lied when he purchased a handgun, rifle and ammunition, and illegally possessed a weapon as a person who had been committed for mental illness.

Experts had conflicting views on the [bump stock] matter, said defense attorney Tom Berg. But Rick Vasquez, a retired ATF agent and firearms expert, would have told the court the bump stock did not meet the statutory definition of a machine gun. The prosecution dismissed [the] case, he said, because the government couldn’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt the bump stock was a machine gun.

[dwa12479]

So by dismissing the case against him, it avoids the legal scrutiny and establishment of case law. Thats right out of the NY playbook to keep unSAFE from feeling the heat.